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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jose Ibarra appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon the jury
verdict finding him guilty of felony domestic battery, claiming the district court
erred in allowing the admission of expert testimony on the subject of domestic
violence.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
On October 31, 2012, Amber had plans to take two of her children trick-ortreating with her estranged husband, Ibarra, from whom she was separated at
that time. (Trial Tr., p.173, L.22 - p.174, L.22, p.175, Ls.10-15.) When Amber
failed to arrive on time to meet Ibarra, he called her, angry, wanting to know
where she was. (Trial Tr., p.175, L.18 - p.176, L.9.) Ibarra told Amber his car
was broken down and instructed her to meet him at Winco, which she agreed to
do. (Trial Tr., p.176, Ls.14-22.)
When Amber arrived at Winco, Ibarra got into her van with her. (Trial Tr.,
p.177, Ls.12-20.)

Ibarra began arguing with Amber inside the van in the

presence of their two children and one of Amber's other children.

(Trial Tr.,

p.174, Ls.13-16, p.177, Ls.8-11.) Ibarra was angry because Amber had been
trick-or-treating with her older son's father and Ibarra was jealous.
p.178, Ls.6-11.)

(Trial Tr.,

Ibarra told Amber's older son to tell his dad to "F off' and

threatened the boy's father's life if he ever saw him again. (Trial Tr., p.178, L.21
- p.179, L.9.)
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At one point, Ibarra told Amber to get out of the car because he wanted to
"check to see if [she] had been cheating." (Trial Tr., p.179, Ls.10-25.) Ibarra did
this by sticking his hand down Amber's pants. (Trial Tr., p.180, Ls.6-7.) Ibarra
also wanted Amber's cell phone, which she eventually gave to him. (Trial Tr.,
p.177, Ls.24-25, p.181, Ls.6-8.) After getting Amber's phone, Ibarra made a call,
then put the phone in his pocket and refused to give it back to Amber despite her
pleas. (Trial Tr., p.181, L.9 - p.182, L.3.) Ibarra then got in his car. (Trial Tr.,
p.182, Ls.15-17.)
When Ibarra got in his car, Amber stuck her arm in the window to try and
unlock the door so she could get her phone back. (Trial Tr., p.182, Ls.15-22.)
Ibarra rolled up the window, trapping Amber's arm, and drove off.
p.182, Ls.22-23.)

(Trial Tr.,

Amber was able to free her arm after running alongside

lbarra's moving car for several feet. (Trial Tr., p.183, L.23 - p.184, L.3; Exhibit
5.) The incident resulted in severe bruising to Amber's arm. (Exhibits 1-4.)
The state charged Ibarra with felony domestic battery and misdemeanor
domestic battery.

(R., pp.10-11, 25-26.)

Prior to trial, the state filed a

"Disclosure of Expert Witnesses" in the area of domestic violence.
62.)

(R., pp.61-

Specifically, the state sought to introduce testimony regarding "the

dynamics of domestic violence, the effects of domestic violence, common
characteristics of domestic violence, why victims often recant, dynamics of and
causes for recanting, and other common characteristics relevant to these facts."
(R., p.62.)

Ibarra objected, arguing the "State's proposed expert has no

knowledge of the facts of this case, has not interviewed either the Defendant or
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the alleged victim, and has no knowledge of whether a domestic violence
incident ever occurred" and, therefore, he claimed, the testimony was not
relevant. (R., pp.64-65.) Ibarra further argued that the state's "request is that it
wishes to have its expert assist the jury in evaluating the victim's credibility,"
which is the jury's role, and that the state was "attempting to dress up common
human emotions and motives into something that is only understandable by
'experts."' (R., p.64.) Finally, Ibarra argued the proposed expert testimony would
"cause unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and/or mislead the jury." (R.,
p.65.)
The court conducted a hearing on the admissibility of the state's proffered
expert testimony and ruled:
Until I hear the witness's qualifications and the actual
opinions that are being offered by the state, I don't know that I'm in
a position to exercise [my] discretion. I do believe that expert
testimony in this area, providing appropriate foundation is laid, is
probably admissible. I don't think it is in the same nature as speed
or whether somebody is under the influence of alcohol or drunk or
some of the things that are generally recognized as lay opinion.
I do think that somebody that has worked with domestic
violence victims for a significant period of time and studied them
probably is in a position to present help, information, and testimony
that would be helpful to the jury. Of course that opinion would be
subject to vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and clear instruction on the burden of proof and
everything, and then the jury could put whatever weight, if any, they
feel to put on that testimony just like any other testimony.
So provided the appropriate foundation is laid, the court is
inclined and probably would admit such testimony ....
(3/14/2013 Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.11, L.19.)
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Consistent with the court's pre-trial ruling, Dr. Lisa Bostaph testified at trial
regarding the characteristics of domestic violence, including why domestic
violence victims sometimes recant. (See generally Trial Tr., pp.235-246.) The
jury found Ibarra guilty of felony domestic battery but acquitted him of the
misdemeanor charge.

(R., pp.140-141.) The court imposed a unified 10-year

sentence with two and one-half years fixed and denied lbarra's request for Rule
35 relief.

(R., pp.159-160, 184-192.)

judgment. (R., pp.161-164.)
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Ibarra filed a timely appeal from the

ISSUE
Ibarra states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing the State to
present expert testimony on the subject of domestic violence?
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.)

The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Parton failed to establish error in the admission of Dr. Lisa Bostaph's
testimony about the characteristics of domestic violence, including the reasons
domestic violence victims recant?
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ARGUMENT
Ibarra Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Allowing Dr. Bostaph To Testify, Based On Her Expertise Related To Domestic
Violence, About The Characteristics Of Domestic Violence And The Reasons
Victims Of Domestic Violence Recant
A.

Introduction
Ibarra contends the district court abused its discretion in allowing Dr.

Bostaph to testify "on the subject of domestic violence," arguing Dr. Bostaph's
testimony was "not helpful to the jury" and, "[a)lternatively," "any limited relevance
of Dr. Bostaph's testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial effect." (Appellant's
Brief, p.8.) Both of lbarra's arguments fail. The district court correctly concluded
that Dr. Bostaph's testimony was admissible in this case.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The determination of whether expert testimony will assist the trier of fact

lies within the broad discretion of the trial court." State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558,
563, 300 P.3d 1046, 1051 (2013) (quoting Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark,
Inc., 150 Idaho 240, 252, 245 P.3d 992, 1004 (2010)).

C.

Ibarra Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Permitting Dr. Bostaph's Testimony
"To be admissible, the expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact to

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." State v. Joslin, 145
Idaho 75, 81, 175 P.3d i64, 770 (2007) (quotations omitted); see also I.R.E. 702.
"The function of the expert is to provide testimony on subjects that are beyond
the common sense, experience and education of the average juror."
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State v.

Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 42, 966 P.2d 33, 42 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted).
Only where the normal experience of the jurors permits them to draw proper
conclusions from the facts and circumstances are expert conclusions or opinions
inadmissible.

kl

Expert testimony "about the effects of domestic violence on

victims" is admissible. See State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 855, 26 P.3d 31, 38
(2001); see also Com. v. Goetzendanner, 679 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Mass. App. Ct.
1997) (citations omitted) ("We conclude, as have courts in other jurisdictions, that
the pattern of behavioral and emotional characteristics common to the victims of
battering lies beyond the ken of the ordinary juror and may properly be the
subject of expert testimony.").
The district court concluded that expert testimony on domestic violence
would be "helpful to the jury." (3/14/2013 Tr., p.11, Ls.7-11.) Ibarra argues this
was error because there was no "evidence that the lbarras were involved in any
type of on-going, violence infused relationship." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Thus,
he concludes, Dr. Bostaph's testimony "was not helpful to jurors, who would be
more than capable of determining whether Mr. Ibarra was guilty based upon
[Amber's] testimony and
presented."

impeachment thereof,

(Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.)

and the other evidence

Although not entirely clear, this

argument appears to be a restatement of lbarra's objection below that Dr.
Bostaph's testimony was not relevant because she had no knowledge of whether
the lbarras had a "domestic violence relationship." (R., p.65.) However, nothing
in I.R.E. 702 requires an expert to have specific knowledge of the facts of the
case in which the expert is testifying and it is not uncommon that an expert
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testifies on a subject matter without reference to the specific facts of the case.
See, sUL., State v. Dutt, 139 Idaho 99, 104, 73 P.3d 112, 117 (Ct. App. 2003)
(expert testimony about "general progression of child sexual abuse through
various phases, as well as the behavior and characteristics of victim and offender
during the progression through those phases" without "link[ing] the general
progression of child sexual abuse to the particular circumstances of the offenses
with which Dutt was charged"). Nor does it matter, as Ibarra suggests, that there
was no evidence of "any type of on-going violence infused relationship."
(Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Ibarra certainly cites no authority for the proposition that
expert testimony on the characteristics of domestic violence is only relevant and
admissible where there is evidence of an "an on-going violence infused
relationship." (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) For purposes of admissibility, the only
question is whether the expert's opinion would "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."

I.R.E. 702.

That

standard was satisfied in this case.
At the hearing on the state's motion to admit Dr. Bostaph's testimony, the
state noted the testimony would include an explanation of "reasons why some
victims may minimize or recant" and "why somebody has been at the hands of
abuse by a defendant would come in and then state that it didn't happen or
minimize it generally." (3/14/2013 Tr., p.8, L.22 - p.9, L.2.) Such an explanation
was important in this case because Amber's testimony evolved by the time of trial
and the evidence showed that this was a result of lbarra's efforts to control her a core characteristic of domestic violence.
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The day after the domestic battery, Amber sought assistance from the
Nampa Family Justice Center where she met with Officer Travis Woodbury.
(Trial Tr., p.150, L.25 - p.151, L.14.)

After speaking with Amber, Officer

Woodbury believed that Ibarra battered Amber. (Trial Tr., p.151, L.21 - p.152,
L.7.) Also at the Family Justice Center, Amber completed an application for a
civil protection order.

(Trial Tr., p.196, Ls.10-17.)

In her application, Amber

wrote that she was scared during the incident at Winco and that Ibarra
threatened to kill all of them because he had "nothing to lose." (Trial Tr., p.195,
L.25 - p.196, L.9.) Amber also indicated on her protection order application that
Ibarra had, on a prior occasion, attempted to strangle her. (Trial Tr., p.270, L.22
-p.271,L.1.)
On November 20, 2012, approximately three weeks after the incident,
Amber also testified at lbarra's preliminary hearing.

At that hearing, Amber

testified about her argument with Ibarra, including that he put his hand down her
pants to check to see if she had had sex with someone else, took her cell phone,
and threatened to kill her and her children. (P.H. Tr., p.7, L.17 - p.9, L.15.)
Amber also described what happened when she put her arm in lbarra's car
window in an effort to retrieve her cell phone, testifying:
Then he turned the car on, went to take off and rolled my
arm up in the window and then he took off and went around the
corner a little bit and drug me, ran over my foot in the process and
then I pulled my arm out ....
(P.H. Tr., p.9, Ls.22-25.)
By the time of trial, Amber modified her testimony, claiming she was
"pretty sure" she consented to Ibarra putting his hand down her pants and that
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she was scratching and hitting Ibarra when she put her arm in the car window,
which Amber admitted she failed to mention to Officer Woodbury or include in her
preliminary hearing testimony, claiming she did not do so because she did not
want to get "in trouble" for "scratching and hitting" Ibarra. (Trial Tr., p.180, L.17p.181, L.1, p.184, Ls.10-23, p.191, L.3 - p.192, L.6.) Amber further testified at
trial that the prosecutor was not "listening to what [she] had to say about
everything," and that Ibarra was just "trying to get away from [her] attacking him."
(Trial Tr., p.226, Ls.9-11, p.230, Ls.7-16.) Amber also claimed Ibarra is a good
father, a good husband, and that she feels safe around him. (Trial Tr., p.226,
L.19 - p.227, L.1.) By the time of trial, Amber claimed Ibarra did not batter her
on October 31. (Trial Tr., p.268, Ls.11-13.)
The characteristics of domestic violence, and particularly the dynamics of
power and control, as described by Dr. Bostaph (Trial Tr., p.238, L.20 - p.239,
L.4), were helpful to the jury to understand why Amber's version of what
happened changed by the time of trial. This is particularly true where, as here,
there was evidence that Ibarra attempted, and in fact did, exert control over
Amber's testimony. Ibarra called Amber 30 times after the incident. (Trial Tr.,
p.197, Ls.13-20.) Portions of three of those calls were admitted at trial. (Exhibit
6.)

During those calls, Ibarra encourages Amber not to testify, to write a

statement for his attorney, and advises her that "they" cannot force her to testify.
(Exhibit 6.) In one call, Ibarra says:
Doesn't fuckin matter, dude. Doesn't fuckin matter. If you don't
want me out, then don't get me out, dude. Plain and simple. I'll
fuckin' hate you for the rest of my life though. Know what I'm
sayin? I'm trying to move forward from this, from all this shit and I
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wanted to call you and fuckin apologize to your ass but if you don't
want to fuckin take my apologies and wanna still say something
happened, then do it.
(Exhibit 6, Track 3.)
Amber relented to lbarra's intimidation, which is not only illustrated by her
trial testimony, but also by emails she sent to lbarra's attorney (as Ibarra
instructed her to do), claiming that when she was "in court at the prelim and on
the paperwork [she] filled out for the protection order," she "left out" that she had
been "hitting and scratching" Ibarra when she put her hand in the car window.
(R., p.85.) Indeed, Ibarra moved to dismiss the case based on Amber's emails.
(R., pp.83-88.)

Based on the circumstances of the case, Dr. Bostaph's testimony was
admissible because it assisted the trier of the fact in understanding the evidence
and determining a fact in issue - namely, why Amber modified her version of
events and minimized her fear and lbarra's culpability.

lbarra's claim that the

testimony was improper absent evidence of an "on-going, violence infused
relationship" is without merit.
Ibarra alternatively argues that, even if "Dr. Bostaph's testimony was
helpful to the jury in some way," the testimony as "substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Specifically, Ibarra complains there
was a "danger that the jury would consider Dr. Bostaph's testimony as describing
the lbarras' actual relationship, and that they would render a verdict based, not
upon the evidence actually presented, but upon the presumption that [he] is a
'batterer' and he must be guilty" or "presume" that Ibarra "would commit violent
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acts against [Amber] in the future." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) This argument is
belied by the fact that Dr. Bostaph testified she knew nothing about the facts of
the case and had "no idea" whether any of her testimony applied to them. (Trial
Tr., p.237, L.19 - p.238, L.3, p.247, L.7 - p.248, L.5.)

lbarra's argument also

presupposes the jury failed to follow the instructions that required them to find the
elements of the charged offenses, beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to find
Ibarra guilty. (R., pp.111, 124, 125.) The legal presumption is, however, exactly
the opposite - jurors are presumed to follow the court's instructions.

State v.

Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, _ , 313 P.3d 1, 25 (2013). Finally, lbarra's argument is
undermined by the fact that the jury acquitted him of one of the charges. If, as
Ibarra claims, Dr. Bostaph's testimony would have caused the jury to convict him
on the assumption he is a "batterer," the jury would have convicted him of both
charges. lbarra's claim that Dr. Bostaph's testimony was inadmissible because it
was unfairly prejudicial fails.

D.

Even If This Court Concludes Ibarra Has Met His Burden Of Showing
Evidentiary Error, Any Such Error Is Harmless
Even if the court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Bostaph to testify,

which it did not, any error was harmless. Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that
"[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded."

I.C.R. 52.

"The inquiry is whether, beyond a

reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] even
without the admission of the challenged evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho
664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
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24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)); see also State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
Even under her revised version of events, Amber testified that Ibarra rolled
up the window of his car while her arm was in it and drove away and Amber
clearly suffered injuries as a result.

(Trial Tr., p.182, Ls.17-23.)

testimony was corroborated by the Winco surveillance footage.

Amber's

(Exhibit 5.)

Regardless of whether Amber hit or scratched Ibarra while she had her arm in
the car, lbarra's actions constituted felony domestic battery. 1

(See R., p.124

(elements instruction).) Beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have
convicted Ibarra of felony domestic battery without Dr. Bostaph's testimony.
Application of the legal standards relevant to the admission of expert
testimony to the facts of this case shows the district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting Dr. Bostaph's testimony.
otherwise.

Ibarra has failed to show

Even if Ibarra has met his burden of showing error, any error was

harmless.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm lbarra's conviction for
felony domestic battery.
DATED this 24 th day of April, 2014.

De

CA M. LORELLO
ty Attorney General

Notably, Ibarra did not request a self-defense or mutual combat instruction.
(See Trial Tr., p.274, L.19 - p.278, L.15.)
1
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 24th day of April 2014, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

JESSICA M. LORELLO
D~ty Attorney General
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